[Eng] Grand Bargain and Grand Chessboard (English Version)

It has been just 100 days since Donald Trump’s return to the presidency. In that brief time, his statements and actions have relentlessly shaken the world, sending markets and currencies into motion as if they were game pieces. His diplomatic and military maneuvers follow a similar rhythm: one day, he demands that NATO bear its own costs; the next, he praises it as indispensable—only to call it "obsolete" shortly thereafter. Rather than the whims of a monarch, his conduct more closely resembles policies issued in the morning and rescinded by nightfall. It underscores his unpredictability, yet also hints at a flexibility unbound by rigid ideology. Ironically, this very trait may position Trump’s diplomacy as a modern incarnation of the Cold War-era “Grand Bargain.”

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union, while brandishing nuclear arsenals, pursued pragmatic compromises to ease tensions. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, brokered by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, stands as a landmark achievement. That Reagan—once seen as a hardliner—engaged the Soviets in dialogue is especially notable. Similarly, the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) established a framework to limit the number of nuclear-armed states to five, curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. These historic agreements exemplify the "Grand Bargain," achieved amid a delicate balance of rivalry and cooperation.

Today, Trump, whether intentionally or instinctively, seems to be reviving this realist approach. Imagine a U.S. envoy meeting President Putin in Moscow to discuss a Ukraine ceasefire or restrictions on intermediate-range missiles—moves that would echo the spirit of the INF Treaty. Toward China, Trump could use threats of steep tariffs, such as 145%, to pressure Beijing into arms control talks. His strategy of using unpredictability as leverage may represent a situationally adaptive form of realism.

The Failure of the “Grand Chessboard”

Any discussion of Cold War geopolitics inevitably leads to Zbigniew Brzezinski. In his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski argued that control of Eurasia was essential for global dominance, designating the former Soviet sphere as the "heartland." His geopolitical framework heavily influenced neoconservative (neocon) strategies for unipolar dominance, leading some to see the neocons as his intellectual heirs. However, Brzezinski himself was no simple militarist. Unlike the neocons' often romanticized interventionism, he was a hard-nosed realist who prioritized influence and alliances over raw force.

As the 21st century unfolded, America’s model of unipolar dominance began to diverge from reality. The Iraq War of 2003, costing over $2 trillion and countless lives, failed to stabilize the Middle East. The 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan revealed how two decades of U.S. military engagement could be undone by the Taliban’s swift resurgence. The notion that military might and ideological projection alone could control the world has proven increasingly untenable in a multipolar environment.

The Ukraine war further underscores the collapse of this model. NATO’s eastward expansion provoked Russia’s invasion, while Western military support has prolonged the conflict and burdened economies. The simplified hegemonic logic of the "Grand Chessboard" can no longer account for today’s complex, interwoven geopolitical realities.

The Evolution of the Grand Bargain

Looking ahead to 2025, the contrast between Trump’s revived "Grand Bargain" and the Cold War’s "Grand Chessboard" becomes sharper. Trump effectively rejects the neocon pathway of military confrontation and Brzezinski’s containment strategies, opting instead for negotiation and compromise. If ceasefire talks with Russia proceed in Moscow, including proposals for restricting intermediate-range missiles, it would signal a contemporary revival of the INF spirit. Similarly, negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program—potentially involving the U.S., Russia, China, and Iran in Oman—could work to reinforce the NPT framework. In U.S.-China relations, tariff pressures might become tools to draw Beijing into broader arms control discussions.

These efforts, whether calculated or instinctive, align—at least in part—with John Mearsheimer’s theory of "offensive realism," acknowledging the inevitability of great-power competition while seeking to avoid outright conflict. Trump’s "Grand Bargain" may thus represent an attempt, however imperfect, to build a new realist-based international order.

Limits and Future Prospects

Yet this approach faces significant limitations. Deep-seated mistrust among the U.S., Russia, and China could easily derail negotiations. Trump’s unpredictability, while a tactical asset at the negotiating table, risks unsettling allies and undermining the broader architecture of cooperation. Domestically, challenges persist. Neocon influence has not vanished entirely, and the increasingly populist nature of congressional politics could destabilize any strategic diplomatic efforts. U.S. allies like Japan, if sidelined in the short term, could impose unforeseen diplomatic costs over the longer run.

Nevertheless, in today’s multipolar world, flexible realist negotiations offer a pragmatic path worth watching. If a Ukraine ceasefire or a U.S.-China arms control agreement materializes after 2025, it would mark a pivotal moment—demonstrating that multipolarity need not mean global chaos. If negotiations fail, however, heightened great-power tensions could drive the world into further instability—or possibly even toward a new Cold War-like order.

In short, the world stands at a historic crossroads. With the neocon-inherited "Grand Chessboard" at an impasse, will Trump’s improvisational "Grand Bargain" fill the void? One thing is certain: the world is becoming more multipolar and more fragmented. No one can win comprehensive mastery over the Grand Chessboard anymore.