[Eng] The Normalization of Russia-Taliban Relations

On April 17, 2025, Russia’s Supreme Court lifted the terrorist designation of the Taliban, formalizing a remarkable normalization of relations between Moscow and the Afghan militant group. This development marks a stunning reversal when viewed against the backdrop of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) and the United States’ support for the mujahideen under Zbigniew Brzezinski, which indirectly contributed to the Taliban’s emergence. Russia’s contemporary realist foreign policy, however, prioritizes counterterrorism, anti-Western strategies, and economic interests, sidelining historical enmities.

The groundwork for this rapprochement was laid following the Taliban’s reestablishment of the Islamic Emirate in Kabul on August 30, 2021. Russia maintained its embassy in Afghanistan, preserving diplomatic channels, and by September 2022, secured agreements to supply fuel and wheat. These efforts bore fruit, with the Taliban invited to an international conference in Kazan in July 2023. President Vladimir Putin, declaring cooperation with the Taliban a matter of “national interest,” issued a decree in February 2025 to prepare for delisting the group, a decision now realized by the Supreme Court.

Drivers of Normalization
The Taliban’s effective control over Afghanistan underpins this shift. Having ended the civil war and established stable governance, the Taliban functions as the de facto government, despite lacking international recognition. Another critical factor is the threat posed by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). The March 2024 Moscow terrorist attack, claimed by ISIS-K and killing over 140 people, underscored the urgency of counterterrorism for Russia. The Taliban, which views ISIS-K as an adversary and has conducted military operations against it, aligns with Moscow’s security priorities. The ongoing Ukraine war (2022–present) and resulting tensions with the West have further driven Russia and the Taliban toward a shared anti-Western alignment. Economic opportunities, including Afghanistan’s lithium deposits and infrastructure projects, also bolster Russia’s interest.

Russia’s Strategic Objectives
Russia’s Taliban policy is a quintessential expression of realpolitik. Once derided as a “negative legacy” of U.S. policy, the Taliban has been repurposed as both a tool of anti-American propaganda and a geopolitical partner. The immediate goal is counterterrorism: the Taliban’s capacity to suppress ISIS-K makes cooperation more valuable to Russia’s security than confrontation. This aligns with Moscow’s broader anti-Western strategy, which, amid heightened tensions over Ukraine, seeks to strengthen a counter-hegemonic bloc alongside China and Iran.

Economic interests are equally central. Afghanistan’s lithium, natural gas, the TAPI pipeline, and transcontinental railway projects offer investment opportunities for Russian firms, and normalization provides the legal framework to pursue them. Maintaining influence in Central Asia, where Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states form a critical buffer, is another priority. Cooperation with the Taliban helps prevent terrorism and instability from spilling over, reinforcing Russia’s regional hegemony.

Domestic Reactions and the Evolution of Historical Memory
In Russia, public and elite reactions to the Taliban policy largely align with the government’s pragmatism. The Kremlin frames cooperation as essential for counterterrorism and national interests, particularly after the 2024 Moscow attack elevated ISIS-K as the primary threat. The trauma of the Soviet-Afghan War and historical Islamophobia are fading, aided by the Putin regime’s strategic embrace of figures like Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov and its management of domestic Muslim communities. The Taliban is increasingly portrayed as a “manageable partner,” softening religious prejudices. Among urban and younger Russians, the Afghan War is a distant memory, and ISIS-K’s threat dominates public concerns.

Initially, skepticism persisted in the Russian parliament and security apparatus, citing risks tied to the Chechen wars and the Taliban’s 1990s support for al-Qaeda. However, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Ministry countered that the Taliban has not been linked to Russian domestic terrorism since 2021 and actively combats ISIS-K. Putin’s decisive leadership ultimately silenced dissent, subordinating historical grievances to pragmatic national interests.

Western Frictions and Global Implications
Russia’s Taliban policy is poised to deepen tensions with the West. The Taliban’s human rights violations—particularly restrictions on women’s education and employment and its strict Islamic law—draw widespread condemnation. Russia’s treatment of the Taliban as a legitimate government invites accusations of disregarding human rights. Western skepticism about the Taliban’s break with ISIS-K and al-Qaeda further complicates counterterrorism cooperation, with Russia’s engagement seen as legitimizing a terrorist entity, potentially undermining intelligence sharing and global counterterrorism efforts.

Geopolitical competition is intensifying. Russia’s embrace of the Taliban strengthens the anti-Western axis, prompting the West to explore limited engagement with the Taliban to counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence, while India expands its economic presence. The incoming Trump administration (2025–) may prioritize deal-making with Russia, tempering hardline responses, while the Taliban, seeking to break its isolation, may maintain dialogue with the West.

In sum, Russia’s normalization of ties with the Taliban reflects a calculated pivot driven by security, economic, and geopolitical imperatives. By transforming a historical adversary into a strategic partner, Moscow underscores its commitment to a multipolar world order, even as it risks further alienation from the West.